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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHESTER E. FARROW,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION,
a corporation, SALT LAKE CLINIC,
a professional corporation,
LOUIS J. SCHRICKER, M.D. and
LOUIS G. MOENCH, M.D.
Defendants and Respondents.:

----------------------------------BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
HEALTH SERVICES CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a medical malpractice action for personal
injuries suffered by the plaintiff after he jumped from his
hospital window.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Health Services Corporation after the plaintiff failed to submit
affidavits from his expert witnesses.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment
below.

-1-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

This respondent finds it necessary to make a complete
statement of facts because (1) there are numerous misstatements
of the record found in the appellant's brief and (2) the
appellant has taken portions of his statement of facts from the
testimony of witnesses at trial, whereas such testimony was not
before the court at the time it granted the summary judgment
herein questioned.

The statement of facts contained in this

brief will refer only to those facts presented to the court by
way of submissions of the parties prior to trial.

The Complaint and History
The hospital chart shows that Mr. Farrow was admitted
to the LDS Hospital on August 12, 1974, with a primary diagnosis
of cervical spondylosis and a herniated cervical disc
1, cover sheet).

(Exhibit~

His history upon admission shows that he had

hit his left arm on a projecting mirror from his Blazer vehicle,
causing considerable pain (Exhibit D-1, P. 195A).

The plaintiff

was not being admitted to the hospital for psychiatric, emotional
or mental reasons.
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Early Post-Surgical Events
The summary in the hospital record prepared by the
treating physician, L. J. Schricker, M.D., indicates that on
August 15, 1974, Mr. Farrow had performed on him a cervical
laminectomy in an operating room at the LOS Hospital (Exhibit o1, P. 195B).

It was noted that on or about the third post-operative
day Mr. Farrow evidenced some withdrawal and irritability
(Exhibit D-1, P. 195B).

A social worker from the hospital was

called in.
The progress notes of the social worker, Kent
Griffiths, dated August 20 (Exhibit D-1, P. 87), reveal that on
that date he had a long discussion with the plaintiff concerning
his personal and marital difficulties.

Mr. Griffiths stated,

"His confusion seems to revolve around the lack of any consistent
meaning to the significant relationships in his life.

He loves

his family dearly but is unable to express those feelings to them
and is often suppressed by his wife when he tries to talk to
her."
The progress note of August 22 of Dr. Schricker
(Exhibit D-1, P. 87) states, "Much clearer!

Doing well.

Ambulating well."
The progress note of Kent Griffiths, the social worker,
of August 22 (Exhibit o-1, P. 88) shows that Mr. Griffiths
discussed the family problems with the plaintiff's wife.
According to Mr. Griffiths:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There definitely are and have been for
years problems in this marriage that
need psychiatric if not other forms of
counseling. There seems to have been
little give-and-take and this has
affected not only the marriage but the
children as well.
Feelings of jealousy,
inadequacy, resentment, fear, and
withdrawal have been expressed. Will
continue.

The Morning of August 23
On August 23, 1974, Dr. Schricker noted that the
plaintiff asked for psychiatric help on that day for the first
time.

Neurologically he was doing quite well.

Dr. Schricker

noted that the plaintiff was "clear and well oriented, seems
happier today" (Exhibit D-1, P. 88).

The Evening of August 23
Dr. Moench, the psychiatrist, visited the patient in
his room between about 7:00 and 8:00 p.m. on August 23, 1974. At
about 8:00 p.m. Dr. Moench prepared a report of consulation
(Exhibit D-1, P. 68-69) and ordered a change in medication
(Exhibit D-1, P. 488).
Nurse LaRona Callahan, who was on duty on the
neurosurgical ward on the afternoon shift of August 23, 1974,
reports that following Dr. Moench's visit that evening, Mr.
Farrow rested quietly.

He talked quite rationally and responded

well to Nurse Callahan's conversations (Affidavit of LaRona
Callahan, paragraph 15, R. 220).
Further details concerning the care given by nursing
personnel to Mr. Farrow on the evening of August 23, 1974, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the early morning of August 24, 1974, are summarized beginning at
page

8 of this brief.

The Early Morning of August 24
At about 2:40 a.m. on August 24, 1974, the nurses on
duty heard a loud crash from glass breaking.

Upon entering the

plaintiff's room they noted that the window was broken and that
Mr. Farrow was gone (Exhibit D-1, P. 88-89).
The plaintiff had jumped from the window in his sixth
floor room and had landed on his back on a roof at the second
floor level (Deposition of Chester E. Farrow, R. 2055-56).

Evidence that Jump Was a Suicide Attempt
The hospital records reveal that at 3:25 a.m. Dr.
Schricker arrived.

His progress notes read as follows:

At time I arrived at 0325 patient was on the
roof at second floor level over the p.t.
entrance. I went out to him and found him
covered with blankets, head sandbagged and
lying as he had landed. Depression in the
roof. Patient alert and conscious. I asked
why he did such a thing and he replied that
life was not worth fighting for, that he had
wanted to die for many months and this seemed
like a good time to do it.
(Exhibit D-1, P. 89).
Later during the day of August 24, 1974, the plaintiff
was visited by the psychiatrist, Dr. Moench. Dr. Moench reports,
"He says he was not thinking of this act at the time I visited
him last night, that he made the decision just before" (Exhibit
D-1, P. 91).
It was the plaintiff's contention that he did not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attempt to commit suicide, but that he was led to jump because of
certain "voices".

We conceded for purposes of the motion for

summary judgment that it was probably not possible to determine
with certainty whether the plaintiff jumped because he intended
to commit suicide or whether, as he claims, he jumped to escape
"voices".
Nonetheless, the respondent, Health Services
Corporation, urged that it was entitled to summary judgment
because there was no genuine issue that any of the alleged
defects in nursing care was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
jump, regardless of his motivations or intentions in jumping.

The Affidavits of Respondent's Expert Witnesses
This respondent had submitted to the court below the
affidavits of three medical experts on the issues of compliance
with the standard of care and the causal relationship between the
nursing care and the plaintiff's jump.

These medical experts

a~

Dr. Charles R. Smart (R. 230-32), Dr. Bruce Alexander Walter (R.
293-320), and Sister M. Caroli ta Hart (R. 234-237).
R. Smart is the Chief of Surgery of the LOS Hospital.

Dr. Charles
Sister M.

Carolita Hart is a nursing expert who has received an M.S. in
nursing from the Catholic University of America and who has been
associated with the Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City and
with the Northwest Family Health Center in Salt Lake City where
she was serving as a family nurse practitioner.

Dr. Bruce

Alexander Walter was the Deputy Director of Health for Medical
Services for the State of Utah.
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The affidavits of Dr. Charles Smart and Sister M.
carolita Hart were based upon a thorough review of the care and
treatment received by the plaintiff during the afternoon and
evening of August 23, 1974, and the early morning hours of August
24, 1974.

Such information was gathered from the hospital

records, the affidavits of the nurses on duty, also filed with
the court below, and the depositions taken in this action.
In summary, these experts found no deficiencies in the
care and treatment rendered by the hospital in the following
areas:
1. The frequency and content of the nursing
care (Hart affidavit, paragraph 6a, R. 235;
Smart affidavit, paragraph 6, R. 231).
2. The decision not to apply physical
restraints (Hart affidavit, paragraph 6c, R.
236; Smart affidavit, paragraph 7, R. 231;
Walter affidavit, paragraph 10, R. 295).
3. The staffing of the neurosurgical ward
(Hart affidavit, paragraph 6d, R. 236; Walter
affidavit, paragraph Ba, R. 294).
4. The determination that the plaintiff was
asleep (Smart affidavit, paragraph B, R.
231).
5. The administering of drugs to the patient
by Karen Pool (Walter affidavit, paragraph
Bb, R. 294).
6
The lack of numbers on some of the pages
of the hospital record (Walter affidavit,
paragraph Be, R. 295).

It was further the opinion of Dr. Smart that there was
no causal connection between the nursing care given to the
window
plaintiff and the plaintiff's jump f rom h's
l
Charles R. Smart, paragraphs 9- lo , R• 232) •

(Affidavit of

Si'milarly, Sister
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Hart stated that any lacking in the areas of frequency of nursing
contacts or the staffing of nurses were not causes or
contributing factors in the plaintiff's jump (Affidavit of
M. Carolila Hart, paragraph 6f, R. 237).

Sist~

Likewise, Dr. Walter

stated that any delay in administering Mellaril was not a
contributing factor in the plaintiff's decision to jump from his
window (Affidavit of Bruce Alexander Walter, paragraph 9, R.
29 5).

The plaintiff submitted no affidavits from expert
medical witnesses to controvert the expert opinions rendered by
these three highly-qualified individuals.

Chronology of Events of August 23 and 24
The following pages record in chronological order the
care and treatment received by Mr. Farrow on the evening and
night in question.

In order to aid the Court in identifying the

hospital employees involved, the following list is provided.
Karen Pool - R.N., afternoon shift charge nurse
LaRona Callahan - L.P.N., afternoon shift
Fern L. Peterson - Nurse's aide, afternoon shift
Agnes Diane Karren - R.N., night shift charge nurse
Judith Hall - L.P.N., night shift
Cathy Hughes - L.P.N., night shift in intensive care
Kent Griffiths - Social worker

A diagram of the chronology of events concerning the
care of the plaintiff has been prepared and is attached to the
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brief as an appendix.

However, for the sake of clarity, a more

complete chronology of events will now be given.
The afternoon of August 23.

On August 23, at 4:00

p.m., Nurse Callahan took the vital signs of the plaintiff in his
room (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 7, R. 219).
Nurse Callahan states that on August 23, sometime
between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., the plaintiff should have received
drinking water if the usual routine procedure were followed
(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 9, R. 219).
On August 23, sometime between the hours of 5:00 and
7:00 p.m., the social worker, Kent Griffiths, talked to the
plaintiff for about an hour on the patio of the hospital.

Mr.

Griffiths noted that the plaintiff seemed more oriented than
during previous meetings with him.

Following their conversation,

the plaintiff returned to his room.
On August 23, sometime between the hours of 5:00 and
7:00 p.m., the plaintiff would have had his evening meal taken to
him under the routine procedures.
have been picked up.

Later, the empty tray would

Nurse Callahan notes from the chart that

the plaintiff had a general diet for dinner and ate his food well
(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 10, R. 219).
The evening of August 23.

On August 23 at about 7:30

p.m., the plaintiff would have received drinking water according
to routine practice (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 11,
R. 219).

On August 23 at about 7:00 p.m., Dr. Moench, the
psychiatrist, made a special trip to the hospital to visit the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plaintiff at the request of Dr. Schricker (Deposition of Louis G,
Moench, R. 2131).

He finished his visit with the plaintiff

sometime after 8:00 p.m.
2147).

(Deposition of Louis G. Moench, R.

During the visit the plaintiff related to Dr. Moench the

problems with his work and his wife's dissatisfaction with his
income.

Following the visit, Dr. Moench made a "Report of

Consultation" (Exhibit D-1, P. 68-69) wherein Dr. Moench
suggested changes in medications and repeated reassurances by
direct nurse contact.

Dr. Moench ordered 100 mg. of the drug

"Mellaril" "stat" and 50 mg. "q.i.d. and p.r.n." (Exhibit D-1, P,
488).

Shortly after Dr. Moench's visit with the plaintiff,
Karen Pool read the consultation report and had a conversation
with Dr. Moench concerning its contents.

Nurse Pool also

talk~

with Nurses Callahan and Peterson, who were on shift with her,
about the situation (Deposition of Karen Pool, R. 1026-28).
On August 23 at 8:00 p.m., Nurse Callahan took the
vital signs of the plaintiff (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan,
paragraph 12, R. 219-20).
On August 23, sometime between the hours of 9:00 p.m.
and 11:00 p.m., Nurse Callahan administered what is called "H.S.
Care" to the plaintiff.

She remembers that following Dr.

Moench's visit, the plaintiff was resting quietly.

When she

entered the plaintiff's room to administer the H.S. Care, he
appeared to be quiet and well oriented.
wanted a back rub and he accepted.

She asked him if he

Also at that time she

straightened up his bed, cleaned his room and talked to him for a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

while, mostly about his little girl and his plans of going home
soon.

Mr. Farrow engaged in the conversation in a rational

manner.

It may also be at this time that Nurse Callahan and the

plaintiff talked about how beautiful the city was at night when
the lights of the city were shining.

It is also possible that

Nurse Callahan would have made more than one visit to the
plaintiff's room in order to complete the H.S. Care (Affidavit of
LaRona Callahan, paragraphs 14-16, R. 220-21).
On August 23, at about 10:00 p.m., Nurse Pool
administered 100 mg. of Mellaril to the plaintiff.

At that time

she asked the plaintiff how he was feeling, and he stated that he
felt much better after having talked to Dr. Moench.

Nurse Pool

asked the plaintiff if he wanted some medication and if there was
anything that she could do for him (Deposition of Karen Pool, R.
1028-29).

On August 23, at about 11:00 p.m., before the end of
the afternoon shift, the plaintiff would have been checked again
according to routine procedure.

(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan,

paragraph 17, R. 221).
On August 23 between 11:00 and 11:45 p.m., Karen Pool,
the charge nurse of the afternoon shift, gave her report to the
nurses coming to work for the night shift.

During this report

she talked to Nurses Karren and Hall about (1) Dr. Moench's
request for the nurses to observe the plaintiff, (2) the
plaintiff being allowed up and around because of the length of
the time since his back surgery, (3) the new medication orders
that Dr. Moench had given and (4) that the plaintiff had been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

quiet, calm and resting and that he had shown no signs of
problems since Dr. Moench's visit (Affidavit of Agnes Diane
Karren, paragraph 6, R. 224-25; Affidavit of Karen Pool,
paragraph 8, R. 216; Deposition of Diane Karren, R. 1057).
The Early Morning of August 24.

At about midnight on

August 24, Nurse Hall visited the plaintiff in his room.
Although Nurse Hall cannot recall all of the details of the
conversation, she does remember that she asked if there was
anything that he needed.
he was alright.

He replied that there was not and that

She made sure that he understood how to call the

nurse with his call light if he should need to and told him to be
sure to call her if there was anything he needed.

He replied

that he would (Affidavit of Judith Vanet Hall, paragraph 6, R.
228).
On August 24, sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 a.m.,
Nurse Karren opened the plaintiff's door and looked in.
was dark and she could see a form on the bed.
quiet.

The room

The room was

The plaintiff did not say anything to her and she said

nothing to him for fear of waking him.

He appeared to be still.

She then closed the door and left the room.

She believes that

she may have had more than one contact with the plaintiff, but
this is the only contact that she can remember having had with
the plaintiff during the night shift of August 23-24 (Affidavit
of Agnes Diane Karren, paragraph 7, R. 225).
At about 2:40 a.m. on August 24, the plaintiff jumped
from his window.
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Other General Observations by the Nurses
The foregoing are the events that the hospital
employees can point to with some degree of certainty as to time,
either because of memory of the event, knowledge of routine
procedures, or entries in the medical chart.

In addition to

these, Nurses Pool, Callahan and Peterson can remember other
items of a general nature which reflect upon their care and
observation of the plaintiff.
Nurse Karen Pool can remember "several contacts" that
she had with Mr. Farrow during the shift.

Although she does not

recall the conversations, she does recall that the plaintiff was
calm, quiet and rational.

He did not do or say anything to

indicate that he was hearing voices or felt presences in his room
or that he was suffering from hallucinations (Affidavit of Karen
Pool, paragraph 7, R. 216).
Nurse LaRona Callahan states that she has a definite
recollection of contacts that she and other nurses had with the
plaintiff during the afternoon shift.

She notes that not all of

the contacts that a nurse has with a patient are charted
(Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraphs 5-6, R. 218-19).

It is

Nurse Callahan's opinion that she personally visited the
plaintiff at least once an hour during the afternoon shift and
that he would have been visited as frequently as every half-hour
during the shift by her or some other nurse (Affidavit of LaRona
Callahan, paragraph 18, R. 221).

Although Nurse Callahan cannot

remember the details of all of the conversations she had with the
plaintiff, she does remember that the conversations centered
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around the plaintiff's plans to leave the hospital and his little
girl.

Such conversations appeared to make the plaintiff feel

better (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 19, R. 221).

It

was Nurse Callahan's observations that Farrow was well oriented,
coherent, calm and relaxed.

He did not tell her of any

happenings that would indicate to her that he was suffering from
hallucinations.

He did not mention voices, appearances or people

in his room (Affidavit of LaRona Callahan, paragraphs 20-21, R,
221-22).
Fern Peterson says that she talked with Farrow on
nnumerous occasions" during the afternoon shift.

Her best

estimate is that she conversed with him "four or five times"
during the afternoon shift.

She did not perform any medical

tests or procedures but was simply there to help carry out Dr.
Moench' s suggestions.

The plaintiff did not say anything to Fern

Peterson about voices or presences in his room (Affidavit of Fern
Peterson, paragraphs 5-7, R. 210).

Objections to the Appellant's Statement of Facts
1.

The first 13 pages of the appellant's statement cl

facts is a summary of the testimony of the plaintiff at trial.
Although the Court might properly consider this record on the
appeals against Moench and Salt Lake Clinic, such testimony is
not part of the record for purposes of the appeals concerning the
Health Services Corporation and Dr. Schricker.
2.

Objection is made to the summary of the progress

notes and nurses notes found at pages 15 through 19 of the
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appellant's brief because the summary is incomplete, interpretive, and filled with transcription errors.

As an example,

the appellant leaves out the progress note of the social worker,
Kent Griffiths, which shows that the request for a psychiatric
consultation relates to the plaintiff's marital problems.

It is

suggested that the Court should consult the hospital records
directly.
3.

The appellant states that the term "stat" means

"right now", without giving any authority for the use of that
term generally or as used by Dr. Moench.

In his deposition, Dr.

Moench clearly stated that the term "stat" can mean either
"immediately" or "now rather than tomorrow" (Deposition of Louis
G. Moench, R. 2146).
4.

The appellant states that Dr. Moench ordered

Mellaril "stat" at 8:00 p.m. and that Dr. Moench finished his
work and left the hospital at 8:00 p.m.
contains a reference to the record.

Neither statement

In fact, the record

discloses that these events did not take place until after 8:00
p.m.

The written medication order does not indicate what time

the order was given.

It does show that the clerk, Schmidt,

endorsed the order at 8:30 and that Nurse Pool signed the order
at 8:50 (Exhibit D-1, P. 488).

Dr. Moench states that he saw

Farrow, finishing somewhere after 8:00 (Deposition of Louis G.
Moench, R. 2147).

Nurse Pool says that she talked to Dr. Moench

after she had read his consultation report (Deposition of Karen
Pool, R. 1027).
5.

The appellant attempts to show that the plaintiff
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was given only a 50 mg. dose of Mellaril at 10:00 p.m. rather
than a 100 mg. dose.

The implication is that Craig Jackson, a

pharmacist at the hospital, filled the order with 50 mg. tablets.
In fact, Craig Jackson states in his deposition that there are
two professionally acceptable methods of filling the order.

One

would have been to send a 100 mg. tablet and a supply of 50 mg,
tablets.

Another method would be to send all 50 mg. tablets

(Deposition of Craig Jackson, R. 970-71).
6.

The appellant states that Karen Pool gave no

reasons for modifying her deposition.

Such is not the case.

See

the record at pages 986-87.
7.

The appellant states that he was given Mellaril at

10:00 p.m. and that he was to have 50 mg. at least every four
hours thereafter.

From this he concludes that he should have

been given more Mellaril by 2:00 a.m.

Apparently, the appellant

is mistaken as to the meaning of the term "q.i.d.".

Dr. Moench,

in interpreting the medication order, stated that 50 mg. of
Mellaril were to be given "for the subsequent day four times a
day as needed" (Deposition of Louis G. Moench, R. 2145).

The

term "q.i.d." means four times a day rather than every four
hours.
8.

The appellant states that Dr. Moench ordered 30 mg.

of Dalmane at "bedtime and as needed".

Such is not the case.

Dr. Moench ordered Dalmane "at bedtime as necessary" (Deposition
of Louis G. Moench, R. 2147).
9.

The appellant states that Nurse Pool visited his

room only twice between 8:00 and 11:00 p.rn.

However, her
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affidavit states that she had "several contacts" with Mr. Farrow
during the shift (Affidavit of Karen Pool, paragraph 7, R. 216),
10.

The appellant states that the L.P.N, on duty during

the afternoon shift visited the plaintiff's room only twice.
However, the affidavit of this nurse, LaRona Callahan, shows that
in her opinion the plaintiff was visited by her at least once an
hour and by someone as frequently as every half-hour (Affidavit
of LaRona Callahan, paragraph 18, R. 221).
11.

The appellant states that there were only two

nurses on duty during the night shift except for the personnel in
the intensive care room who, he says, are not involved with
patients on the floor.

However, Cathy D. Hughes, one of the

nurses on duty in the intensive care unit, stated that one of the
nurses in the intensive care unit is available to help the nurses
on the main neurosurgical ward if one is needed and if the nurses
are not busy with patients in the intensive care unit.

Nurse

Hughes helped Nurses Hall and Karren in doing the work that was
made necessary by the plaintiff's jump (Affidavit of Cathy D.
Hughes, paragraphs 6-7, R. 213).
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ARGUMENT

POINT I:

IN RULING UPON THE CORRECTNESS OF THE SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, THE COURT SHOULD EXAMINE ONLY THOSE
MATTERS IN THE RECORD THAT WERE BEFORE THE COURT
BELOW WHEN THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED

Prior to trial, the respondents, Health Services
Corporation and J. L. Schricker, moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff did not have the expert testimony
needed to sustain his case at trial.

This respondent supported

its motion with an extensive memorandum and with affidavits of a
nurses aide (Peterson), two licenses practical nu rs es (Hughes and
Callahan), three registered nurses (Pool, Karren, and Hall), two
expert medical doctors (Smart and Walter), and one nursing expert
(Hart).

The testimony found in these affidavits were from the

hospital personnel directly involved with the plaintiff and froo
experts in their respective fields who had made thorough
examinations of the factual affidavits, the depositions and the
hospital charts.
In addition, the court had before it the depositions of
defendant Moench, Nurse Pool, the plaintiff, Nurse Karren, Julie
Hansen (medical records department, LOS Hospital), Sidney Walker,
M.D., Mary E. Vaughn (plaintiff's expert) Francis Funk
(plaintiff's expert), C. H. Hardin Branch, M.D.

(plaintiff's

expert), and Craig Jackson (hospital pharmacist).

It was further

stipulated that the hospital records be considered in the court's
determination.

The court also considered the pleadings and
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answers to interrogatories on file.
It is significant to note that the plaintiff did not
submit any affidavits or other materials to be considered by the
court in ruling upon the motions for summary judgment.

Based

upon this substantial record, the court below, after considerable
deliberation, found from the submissions that there was no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that this respondent
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This action continued to trial only for respondents
Moench and Salt Lake Clinic.

Numerous exhibits and voluminous

testimony became a part of the record because of this trial.
However, in examining the propriety of the summary
judgments and in searching the record for genuine fact issues,
this Court should examine only those materials that were before
the court below when it granted the summary judgments.
Otherwise, the summary judgment proceedings are of no value.
Were it otherwise, a trial court would never grant a summary
judgment because of the fear of reversal by an appellate court
that could consider matters outside the record then existing,
even if the plaintiff were unable to demonstrate that he could
make a prima facie case against the defendant.
This Court has already recognized generally that upon
the review of a granting of

a

summary judgment, the Court will

apply the same standard as that applied by the trial court.
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).
A pertinent case is American Universal Insurance Co. v.
Ranson, 59 wash. 2d 811, 370 P.2d 867 (1962), wherein the court
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stated that it would consider only the record before the trial
court at the time the summary judgment was granted:
In an appellate review of a summary
judgment entered pursuant to Rule of
Pleading, Practice and Procedure 56, RCW Vol.
O, this court can review only those matters
that have been presented to the trial court
for its consideration before entry of the
summary judgment.
The reason is
obvious: it would be unfair to consider, on
appellate review, matters not presented to
the trial court for its consideration. We
must have before us the precise record - no
more and no less - considered by the trial
court. The court may consider, of course,
those matters which it may notice judicially.
370 P.2d at 870.
Also in point are Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wash. 2d 880,

441 P.2d 532 (1968), where the Supreme Court of Washington
determined that it would not consider two depositions taken after
the summary judgment was granted, and Spellmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser
~'

14 wash. App. 642, 544 P.2d 107 (1975), where the Court of

Appeals of Washington refused to consider an affidavit from an
expert witness that was filed with a motion for reconsideration
of the summary judgment granted below because the affidavit was
not a part of the record when the lower court granted the
judgment.
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sum~ey

POINT II:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT A HARSH REMEDY WHEN THE
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PRESENT ADEQUATE TESTIMONY TO
MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL

This Court has long recognized that the summary
judgment procedure, while not a substitute for the trial of
genuine, material fact issues, is a very beneficial procedure to
expedite the resolution of actions that are doomed to failure
because of the lack of any genuine, material fact issue to
present at trial. In Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974),
this Court stated that it is not a harsh rule to tell a party
that he is not entitled to recover as a matter of law when the
facts are not in dispute.

The Court dealt with the notion that

the plaintiff might be able to find other facts to present at the
time of trial, as follows:
Who knows what evidence a party might
produce if given the opportunity? In the
light of the modern pratice under the Rules
of Civil Procedure, a trial is not to be by
ambush. Instead, the evidence upon which one
relies for judgment can be, and should be,
known to the opponent1 and when all the
evidence is known, if there is no dispute on
any material issue of fact, the rules provide
that the court may apply the law and thus
terminate the matter, thereby conserving the
time of the court and avoiding expense to the
state and to the litigants.
Gratuitous statements put in decisions
to the effect that a summary judgment is a
harsh remedy and should never be given if at
trial a party might be able to produc7
evidence which would reasonably sustain a
judgment in his favor, tends to.cause trial
judges to hesitate to grant motions for
summary judgments in those case~ where there
are no disputed issues of material facts.
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The only harsh thing about summary judgments
is for a trial judge to fail in his duty to
apply the law and summarily decide a case
when there is no disputed issue of material
facts.
525 P.2d at 621-22.
To the same effect is
Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific R.R., 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339
( 1957), wherein this Court affirmed a summary judgment in favor
of the defendant based upon extensive pretrial discovery.
Concerning the alleged hastiness of the summary judgment
procedure, the Court stated:
The first attack plaintiff makes upon
the summary judgment is that the procedure is
too hasty. He says that if the case had been
allowed to come to trial in its regular turn
on the calendar, he might have been able to
produce another witness or witnesses. This
contention is without merit. The accident
happened over a year before the motion for
summary judgment was entered. There was no
reasonable assurance that the witness
referred to, a resident of California, might
be found within a reasonable time or at all,
nor that his testimony would help the
plaintiff if available. Speaking generally,
it is to be assumed that when a plaintiff
files his action he has sufficient evidence
to demonstrate a right to recovery.
All he
is entitled to is a reasonable opportunity to
marshal and present such evidence.
318 P.2d at 341.

The Court also ruled that a summary judgment

does not deprive the plaintiff of his right to a jury trial.
On the motion for summary judgment, this respondent
argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because the
plaintiff was unable to produce the expert testimony necessacy ~
prove his medical malpractice case.

There are numerous cases of

recent origin in this region where the courts have upheld the
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granting of summary judgments in medical malpractice actions
where the plaintiffs have failed to produce the requisite expert
testimony.

For example, in Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542,

543 P.2d 1052 (1975), the Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the
granting of a summary judgment in a medical malpractice case
where the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they could
produce expert medical testimony that indicated that the doctor's
care fell below the appropriate standard of care.

To the same

effect is Abernethy v. Smith, 17 Ariz. App. 363, 498 P.2d 175
(1972), where the court affirmed the summary judgment granted by
the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs were unable to
present any competent evidence to show that the defendants had
deviated from the standard of practice.

Likewise, in Morrell v.

St. Luke's Medical Center, 27 Ariz. App. 486, 556 P.2d 334
(1976), the court affirmed the granting of a summary judgment in
a medical malpractice case where the plaintiff was unable to
present even one expert witness to support his allegations of
malpractice or to controvert the affidavits bolstering the
defendants' summary judgment motions.
The Supreme Court of Montana has made a similar ruling
in Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton, 545 P.2d 670 (Mont.
1976), a medical malpractice action against two doctors and a
hospital.

The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of

the hospital and doctors, noting that the plaintiffs had failed
to present any evidence that would establish the applicable
standard of care, that such a standard was departed from, and
that a breach of duty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
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injury.
Similar judgments have also come from Washington.

In

Shoberg v. Kelly, 1 Wash. App. 673, 463 P.2d 280 (1969), the
court dismissed the appeal of a summary judgment in a medical
malpractice action where the plaintiffs were unable to show that
they had or would have medical expert testimony to prove the
applicable standard of care and its violation.

And in Swanson

v. Brigham, 18 Wash. App. 647, 571 P.2d 217 (1977), the court
affirmed the summary judgment entered in favor of a physician in
a medical malpractice action where the plaintiff failed to
present expert medical testimony that the physician's conduct
violated the standard of professional practice.
In the case of Mr. Farrow, his jump occurred in August
of 1974.

Yet in August of 1977, three years later, the plaintiff

was still unable to produce competent expert medical testimony
that the hospital had caused the injuries to the plaintiff by
violating some applicable standard of care.

Summary judgment wu

properly granted.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-24-

POINT III: WHERE IT IS CLAIMED THAT A HOSPITAL SHOULD HAVE
REALIZED THAT A PATIENT, WHO WAS NOT ADMITTED AS
A MENTAL PATIENT, WAS A SUICIDE RISK, THE PLAINTIFF
MUST PRODUCE EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO THE BREACH OF
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF CARE AND AS TO
PROXIMATE CAUSATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF MALPRACTICE

The appellant argues that expert testimony is not
necessary to prove negligence and causation in this case.

In so

arguing, he makes references to cases wherein the patient was
admitted with known mental disorders, psychiatric disorders, or
suicidal tendencies.

Many of the cases involved patients who

were kept in psychiatric wards where the necessity of protecting
the patient against himself was obvious.
here.

Such is not the case

Dr. Moench, the psychiatrist, had visited the plaintiff

only hours before his jump, and Dr. Moench did not consider the
plaintiff a suicidal risk, nor did he order that the plaintiff be
transferred to the psychiatric ward.

The nurses had observed

that the plaintiff was calm and rational that evening.
In such a situation, the affirmative testimony of
experts is necessary to make a prima facie case of malpractice
against the hospital.

A case in point is Dimitrijevic v. Chicago

Wesley Memorial Hospital, 92 Ill. App. 2d 251, 236 N.E.2d 309
(1968), a wrongful death action against a hospital and doctors

for the death of a patient who had jumped from an unguarded
window.

The plaintiff sought to prove malpractice on the part of

the defendants.

The court, however, directed verdicts in favor

of the defendants.

The facts show that the deceden~ had been

suffering from increasing depression and went to the hospital for
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psychiatric treatment.

He was put in a double room on the

eleventh floor next to an unguarded window.

His momements were

not closely restrained and he was not constantly supervised,
Doctor Blackman, upon admission of the patient, diagnosed the
illness as an acute anxiety state and did not consider that the
patient was a suicidal risk.

The plaintiff claimed that the

doctors should have been aware that the patient was a suicidal
risk and that their failure to take the appropriate precautions
was malpractice.
Concerning the necessity of expert testimony the court
stated:
Plaintiff argues that in Kent v.
Whitaker, 58 Wash.2d 569, 364 P.2d 556, and
Stallman v. Robinson, 364 Mo. 275, 260 s.w.
2d 743, the jury was allowed to pass on the
adequacy of the care given patients who took
their own lives while in the care of
physicians without affirmative expert
testimony of negligence. In those cases there
was no question but that the patients were
suicidal risks. The patients had made
previous attempts on their lives, the
defendants acknowledged the serious risk of
suicide and took precautions. The jury was
allowed to evaluate whether the patients were
watched closely enough in view of their
admittedly pronounced suicidal tendencies.
In the instant case the question is much
farther from the ken of the lay mind: were
the symptoms of the decedent such that a
reasonably skillful doctor using customary
methods should have regarded decedent as a
suicidal risk requiring special
precautions? • • •
We think that the question whether defendant doctors failed to exercise ordinary
skill and care in not characterizing decedent
as a suicidal risk falls within the general
rule requiring the affirmative testimony of
experts • • • • The diagnosis and treatment of
plaintiff's decedent was neither so grossly
unskilled nor so clearly within the common
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experience of the jurors that it could go to
the ~ury without affirmative expert
testimony.
236 N.E.2d at 313.

Concerning the hospital's liability the court

stated:
Plaintiff contends that the evidence
established a prima facie case of negligence
against the hospital in that the hospital was
negligent in having decedent next to an unguarded window and in not transferring him to
section 8-W in accordance with Dr. Blackman's
orde:·. We believe that unless the attending
physician recommended special precautions
against suicide the hospital was under no
duty, in these circumstances, to take such
precautions. The evidence is conclusive that
the doctors neither felt such instructions
necessary nor gave them. Dr. Brumlik
prescribed that decedent remain ambulatory.
Dr. Blackman was consulted by the hospital's
administrator over the need for security
precautions. The same is true regarding the
hospital's failure to transfer the patient to
8-W. It contacted Dr. Blackman who said that
the transfer was not an emergency and could
be delayed until there was regular space
available. We believe the hospital had a
right to rely on the instructions of the
doctors and that the evidence does not
support a prima facie case of hospital
negligence.
236 N.E.2d at 314.
In the instant case, the plaintiff was not even a
psychiatric patient.

He was admitted for back surgery. Although

some problems arose concerning disorientation and the plaintiff's
unhappiness with his marriage, there was no indication that he
was a suicidal risk.

Only hours before the plaintiff's jump, Dr.

Moench, the psychiatrist, evaluated the plaintiff but did not
find it necessary to place him in physical restraints or to put
him in a psychiatric ward, even though he recognized that the
plaintiff was on the sixth floor in a room with an unguarded
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window.
be a

Obviously, Dr. Moench did not consider the plaintiff to

suicidal risk.

If, as the Dimitrijevic court states, it is

necessary to show by the affirmative testimony of experts that a
doctor was negligent in not characterizing a patient as a
suicidal risk, logic would seem to compel the necessity of
affirmative expert testimony to show that a

~

should have

substituted her judgment for that of the psychiatrist and
recognized that the plaintiff, who had been resting calmly and
quietly, was a suicidal risk.
Another case in point is Lanczki v. Providence
Hospital, 258 N.W.2d 238 (Mich. App. 1977), where the court
affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant, an
orthopedic surgeon.

h~

The record disclosed that the plaintiff

been admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of a ruptured
disc, and two days later the defendant performed a laminectomy
upon the plaintiff.

On the first day after the operation the

plaintiff was allowed to be ambulatory.

On the morning of August

4, the defendant learned from the plaintiff that he had
experienced a bad night and had not slept well.

The plaintiff

told him, however, that he now felt fine and would like to go
home.

The defendant authorized the plaintiff's discharge.

After

speaking to the doctor, the plaintiff packed his suitcase,
started to get dressed and shortly thereafter jumped from the
window of his room.

Nursing notes indicated that on the previo~

evening the plaintiff was hearing noises of the defendant and the
patient's wife and had appeared to be very nervous and
apprehensive.

But on the morning of the discharge he appear~
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oriented, quiet and cooperative, and was speaking rationally and
ate his breakfast well.

The court considered the plaintiff's

allegations in their most favorable light and with a full
awareness of the strong presumption against the granting of a
summary judgment.

Nevertheless, the court concluded that the

motion was properly granted.

The court reasoned as follows:

"Before plaintiff may maintain a cause
of action, he must establish as a matter of
law that the defendant had a duty to him.
The duty in a malpractice case is the duty to
provide care in accordance with the normal
standards of the physician, and the standard
of the care for a specialist is that of a
reasonable specialist practicing medicine in
light of present day scientific know1 edge • • • •
"Here, the defendant is a board
certified orthopedic surgeon who does not
hold himself out as a specialist in
psychiatry. It is significant that there was
no history of mental disorders and suicidal
attempts by plaintiff at the time of the
incident. The only indication that there
could be any trouble were the nurse's notes
and the nurse's conversation with defendant.
These indicated that the defendant had had a
bad night, had been nervous and apprehensive
and had had some type of hallucination.
"It is significant, however, that the
morning nurse indicated that the patient was
perfectly well oriented and adjusted, and ate
his breakfast well. It is also significant
that the defendant suggested to the plaintiff
that he remain another day, but the plaintiff
said he felt perfectly fine and wanted to go
home.

"The case fails to disclose any legal
duty of defendant to anticipate tha~
.
plaintiff would attempt suicide by JU~p1~g
out of the window. The action of pla1nt1ff
was totally unpredictable and totally
unforeseeable.
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"To hold in this case that defendant had
a duty to recognize a potential psychiatric
disorder and take steps to restrain the
plaintiff extends the duty of defendant far
beyond any reasonable limits. Were such an
unreasonable burden placed upon defendant he
could never safely prescribe any medication
or release any patient without fear of a
malpractice action."
258 N.W.2d at 240-41.
The appellant's cases are not in point, and may be
distinguished as follows:
1.

Lexington Hospital, Inc., v. White, 245 S.W.2d 927

(Ky. App. 1952).
striking.

In this case the need for restraints was

The plaintiff had gotten out of the hospital earlier,'

his paranoid delusions were very apparent.

The entire care of

the patient was turned over to the hospital.

The doctors

involved were hospital principals.
2.

Misfeldt v. Hospital Authority, 101 Ga. App. 579,

115 S.E.2d 244 (1960).

When the doctor called the hospital to

arrange for a room for the patient he stated that the patient was
mentally disturbed and that he would like her to have a "psycho
room".

Numerous people testified about the strange appearance

and the "glary look" in the plaintiff's eyes.

Mr. Farrow was not

admitted as a "psycho" patient.
3.
(1961).

Kent v. Whitaker, 58 Wash. 2d 569, 364 P.2d 556

The plaintiff had attempted suicide just before her

admission, and the hospital knew it.

This was not a malpracti~

case.
4.

Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital and Medical

Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193 (1967).

This is another
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case of a mental patient being admitted to a psychiatric ward,
where there was plenty of warning of a suicidal tendency.
5.

Wood v. Samaritan Institution, Inc., 26 Cal.2d 847,

161 P.2d 556 (1945).

In this case there were very definite signs

of paranoia visible to the nurses.

The afternoon shift

recognized the possibility of restraining the patient but decided
to leave the matter for the next shift.
6.
(1971).

Hunt v. King County, 4 Wash. App. 14, 481 P.2d 593

This case involved a young man who was admitted to a

closed psychiatric ward with a history that included (1) drug
abuse, (2) wildly irrational behavior, (3) chopping up the family
basement with a hatchet and (4) making homicidal threats.

He was

brought to the hospital in handcuffs and restraints by the
police, and his father said that he would try any way possible to
get out.

This case was distinguished in May v. Triple C

Convalescent Centers, 19 Wash. App. 794, 578 P.2d 541 (1978).
7.

Meier v. Ross General Hospital, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903,

445 P.2d 519 (1968).

In this case the patient was in the

psychiatric ward after having tried to commit suicide.

He jumped

out of a window that was not locked in any way.
These cases simply are not relevant to the case at bar
involving a patient who had been in the hospital for many days,
who had not made any attempts to escape, who had not indicated to
any of the nurses that he was suffering from hallucinations, who
had been seen by a psychiatrist earlier in the evening, who
seemed to be at ease and relaxed after his visit with the
psychiatrist, who was talking about going home and about his
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little girl, and who appeared to be asleep shortly before his
jump.

Under such circumstances, it is necessary to present

affirmative expert testimony to prove that the hospital or its
nurses were in some way responsible for Mr. Farrow's jump.
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POINT IV:

THE ONLY ALLEGED BREACH OF STANDARD OF CARE
OF THIS RESPONDENT FOR WHICH THE APPELLANT HAD
ADMISSIBLE EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS THE ALLEGED
FAILURE TO ADMINISTER THE 100 MILLIGRAMS OF
MELLARIL IMMEDIATELY AFTER 8:00 P,M. ON
AUGUST 23

The courts have recognized that in cases involving the
propriety of the treatment of a patient by a doctor or other
similar medical personnel, expert testimony is necessary to
establish liability except where the matter is one of common
knowledge or where the conduct shows a gross neglect or want of
care such as leaving medical supplies in the incision of a
patient.

A case in point is Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40,

347 P.2d 1108 (1959), where the Court held that the standard of
care required by a physician for the casting procedure and postoperative care of a "triple arthrodesis" operation must be
established by expert medical testimony.
A case involving the question of the negligence of
hospital employees is Krause v. Bridgeport Hospital, 362 A.2d 802
(Conn. Sup. Ct. 1975), wherein the appellate court upheld the
directed verdict of the trial court, stating that expert
testimony was necessary to show the negligence of three x-ray
technicians.

Expert testimony was said to be necessary because

the manipulation required for the proper positioning for a barium
enema of a patient who was described as tense and obese, was a
highly technical problem.
According to the court in Defalco v. Long Island
College Hospital, 393 N.Y. Supp. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1977):
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If a hospital employee's acts require
professional skill and knowledge, however,
then it is a case of malpractice. To
establish malpractice by a hospital, expert
medical testimony must be offered to
demonstrate that a resident, interne, nurse
or technician, as the case may be, violated
some accepted standard of good professional
practice and injured the patient.
393 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 864.
In the instant case, the question of how the nurses on
the neurosurgical ward should have handled a patient such as the
plaintiff who, it is claimed, had some unusual mental problems
was a highly technical matter.

To make an informed judgment

ne~ ~

the propriety of the conduct of the nurses the jury would
have the expert opinions of persons acquainted with such

00

hospit~

wards, good nursing care and practice, and the appropriate
standards of care.

This case does not involve simply a matter of

dropping a patient on the floor or misreading a thermometer.
The appellant attempts to supply the requisite

eleme~s

of expert testimony by reference to three depositions taken by
the defendants during discovery.

The appellant chose not to

submit any counter-affidavits and hence, his expert testimony
must be found, if at all, in its proper form in these
depositions.
Rule 56 ( e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure makes
it clear that opposing affidavits must be made on personal
knowledge, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence and showing affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein.

When the court permits

affidavits to be opposed by depositions, such depositions must
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also meet the same standards of personal knowledge, admissibility
and competency.
It is interesting to note that the appellant's main
expert witness, Dr. C. H. Hardin Branch, in a video-taped
deposition, expressed no opinion concerning the negligence of the
hospital.

The main thrust of his opinion testimony was directed

toward the defendants Moench and Schricker.
The appellant sets forth what he terms "an impressive
catalog of failures and omissions" on the part of the hospital
{appellant's brief, P. 37-38).

As will be shown below, this so-

called catalog is nothing more than a shabby list of wishes.
The Testimony of Sydney Walker
The plaintiff attempts to support his claims with the
deposition of Sydney Walker, a California physician.
Dr. Walker's testimony in the deposition should not
have been considered by the court for several reasons.

First,

the plaintiff had no intention, only days before trial, to call
Dr. Walker as a witness.

Mr. Garrett admitted as much in the

arguments on the motions for summary judgment:
MR. BUSHNELL:

That's correct, the

hospita~.

If the Court please, I would like to address
my comments first to Dr. Walker and his
testimony, because we didn't address that in
our memorandum, and for some very obvious
reasons:
One, we are told by Mr. Garrett that they do
not intend to call him as a witness. And I
think you reaffirmed that this mornin~, ~r.
Garrett? You do not intend to have him in?
MR. GARRETT: I do not intend to have him in
(R. 1189-90).
at this point.
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Second, Dr. Walker was not properly qualified to
testify as to the standard of care of nursing practice that
should have been followed at the LDS Hospital.

The doctor made

some statements concerning what the nurses should have done,

a~

yet there is no statement in the record as to how Dr. Walker is
qualified to testify about the nursing profession.

If Dr.

Wal~r

were to appear at trial, his lack of qualification would lead to
an objection from the defendants concerning the doctor's opinions
as to nursing care.
sustained.

Such an objection should properly be

Although the nursing and doctor professions are

related, not every doctor is in the position to be an expert in
the standards of practice of nurses.

In fact, it appears froo

Walker's deposition that he has very little contact with hospital
at all:

Q. What hospitals are you on the staff of?
First of all, are you on the staff of any
hospital?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Which one?

A. Scripps Memorial, Sharp Memorial,
Grossmont, Doctors Hospital and Clairemont
General Hospital.

Q.

Now, is that an active staff membership
in each of those places?

A.
I would say it was active.
I have a very
limited hospital-based practice.
I do visit.

Q. Are you a Senior member at any
institution?
A.

I am not.

Q.

What is your status of your membership?
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A.

Courtesy.

Q.

In all of those that you mentioned?

A.

Yes.

(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 688-90).

The testimony

continues later in the deposition:

Q. Right at the moment, Doctor, how many
patients do you have that you are attending
to in the hospital somewhere?
A.

None.

Q.

And how many have you had this year?

A.

None.

(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 764).
Dr. Walker, therefore, would have little opportunity to
associate with the nursing profession, and there is nothing in
his deposition that qualifies him as an expert in nursing care.
Moreover, there is no foundation to show that Dr. Walker is
familiar with the operation and procedures of hospitals in Utah,
or in similar localities.

In fact, Dr. Walker made a rather

sarcastic reference to practice in Utah when he stated:

Q. That is your opinion of the medical
standard of care?
A.
Absolutely.
care; right.

Q.

Where?

A.

Everywhere.

That is the standard of

Q. Are you sure that that is what it is in
Utah?
A.
I just testified that I don't know what
you folks do out there.

Q. You don't mean everywhere. You don't
mean Utah because you don't know.
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A.
I hope you understood it, we will exclude
Utah.
(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 773).
Even if this lack of foundation were ignored and Dr,
Walker were allowed to testify, it is clear from his deposition
that he has nothing bad to say about the nursing care during the
critical period - after Dr. Moench had visited the plaintiff, •
testified:

Q.

So my question is: What did the nurses
do or fail to do between the time Dr. Moench
was there and the time that the patient went
out the window?
A.
From the time Dr. Moench was there, I
guess nothing.
(Deposition of Sydney Walker, R. 782).
The appellant makes some reference to a letter that Dr.
Walker wrote prior to the taking of his deposition.

It should be

clear that such a letter would not be admissible at trial and,
hence, should not be considered on a motion for summary

judg~~.

Utah law is clear that materials submitted in
opposition to summary judgments should not be considered if they
would not be admissible in trial by reason of containing
Western States Thrift

&

hea~Q.

Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504

P.2d 1019 (1972), inadmissible parol evidence, Rainford v.
Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 41 P.2d 769 (1969), or improper opinion
testimony, Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah~
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973).

In Preston v. Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260,

436 P.2d 1021 (1968) this Court affirmed a summary judgment for
the defendant in a slip-and-fa! l case, despite the fact that an
opposing affidavit setting forth expert testimony was submitted.
-38-
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The Court commented upon the improper foundation for the expert
testimony as follows:
Now, in order for an affidavit to be of
effective use in the determination of a
motion for summary judgment, it must set
forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence. • • • The question of the
similarity of conditions also would be a
matter to influence the trial judge in
determining whether the test performed would
be admissible in evidence. The affidavit
does not state what type of floor was used in
the test, whether it was maple, oak, pine,
covered with linoleum or bare. It would seem
the test was not competent, and the trial
judge would not be reversed in ignoring it
even if it tended to support the allegations
of plaintiff's complaint which were in issue.
436 P.2d at 1022.
This leaves the appellant with only the testimony of
the nurses, Mary E. Vaughn and Frances Funk.

They were listed as

witnesses for the plaintiff only days before trial.

Their

depositions were taken with the result that neither of them
expresses competent expert opinions concerning the adequacy of
nursing care given to the plaintiff with the possible exception
of the speed with which the "stat" order of 100 milligrams of
Mellaril was administered.
The Testimony of Mary Vaughn
During her deposition, Nurse Vaughn repeatedly
attempted to avoid expressing her opinion as to whether the
failure to physically restrain the plaintiff was a violation of
the standard of care of nurses, although she was obviously
singling out that particular failure.

When finally pinned down,

however, Nurse Vaughn had to admit that such failure was not a
breach of the standard of care:
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Q.
• • • Now, would you tell me whether in
your opinion that is a violation of the
standard of care not to have put that patient
under restraint?
A.
I think it would come under there would
be a lot of oldtime nurses that would take
that precaution where a lot of younger nurses
would not, let's put it that way.
Q.

Okay.

A.

Is that fair?

I think so.
I will live with that. So,
in other words, there is a difference in
opinion as to what you would do under these
circumstances?

Q.

A.

Yes, there really is.

Q.

And either one could be considered to be
a proper procedure?

A. That's right.
(Deposition of Mary E. Vaughn, R. 654).
Earlier, Mrs. Vaughn had stated that it was "not
necessarily" a requirement that nurses use restraints on patients
like the plaintiff (Deposition of Mary E. Vaughn, R. 616).

Also,

the other nursing expert, Frances Funk, does not suggest that the
nurses should have put the plaintiff in restraints assuming, as
the affidavits reveal, that the psychiatrist had been in at 8:00
p.m. and that following the visit, the plaintiff was calm, quiet,
and coherent and was not complaining (Deposition of Frances Fu~.
R. 584-85).
Hence, Mrs. Vaughn is saying that in such a situation
nurses following one school of thought would use restraints but
nurses following another school would not and that either coune
of treatment would be acceptable.
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The case law supports the proposition that in such a
case the following of the procedures of a respectable school of
thought does not constitute negligence.

For example, the court

in Sims v. Callahan, 112 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 1959), stated:
The law does not permit a physician to
be at ~he mercy of testimony of his expert
competitors, whether they agree with him or
not. In the case of Jackson v. Burton, 226
Ala. 483, 485, 147 So. 414, 416, this court
said:
"* * * The rule of law under such
circumstances is that:
'Where there are
various recognized methods of treatment the
physician is at liberty to follow the one he
thinks best, and is not liable for malpractice because expert witnesses give their
opinion that some other method would have
been preferable.' ••

The Testimony of Frances Funk
Nurse Funk testified that the nurses gave the plaintiff
only routine care during the night in question.

However, it

should be noted that her opinion as to the care given was based
solely upon the hospital chart:
Q.
(By Mr. Garrett) In your opinion there
was nothing given this man other than routine
care; is that correct?

A.

Routine custodial care.

MR. BUSHNELL: That is based completely on
the record, isn't it, that you have seen?
THE WITNESS:

Yes, that is all I know.

(Deposit ion of Frances Funk, R. 577).
She does not know of any conduct of the nurses other
than what is written in the chart, (Deposition of Frances Funk,
R. 5 51), and she admits that she does not have any idea how many

contacts the nu rs es had with the plaintiff because she was not
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there and had not talked to any of the nurses directly involved
(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 558-59).
The hospital chart (Exhibit D-1, P. 209) shows

only a

few of the nursing contacts that were had with the plaintiff
during the evening and night in question.

The affidavits of the

nursing personnel that were filed with the court with the

moti~

for summary judgment revealed many other i terns of care that Mrs.
Funk did not have knowledge of at the time she gave her
deposition.

These affidavits must be assumed to contain true

statements of additional care for purposes of the motion becauu
counter-affidavits were not produced under Rule 56 procedures.
Hence, Mrs. Funk's opinions are based upon inadequate foundation
and should be rejected.
Besides, Mrs. Funk's suggestion that only routine

~n

was given must not have been a reflection upon the compliance of
the nurses with the proper standard of care, because she states:
Q. Do you have an opinion as to the adequacy
of the nursing care from the time Dr. Moench
was there until the patient went out the
window?
A.

I can't give you an opinion on that.

(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 559).
Her approach appears to be that because the plaintiff
jumped somebody must have been at fault:

Q. Well, that is kind of a hindsight
approach, isn't it, Mrs. Funk, and that is
that any time somebody goes out the window
then the nurses must have failed? Is that
what you are saying to me?
A.

Somebody failed.
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Q. Are you saying it is the nurses that
failed?

A.

I am not saying it is the nurses.

Q.

Okay.

A. I am just saying that he wasn't given the
support that he evidently,needed.
Q.

Okay.

But whose fault was that?

A,

I don't know.

Q. Do you have an opinion as to whose fault
it was?

A.

No, I don't.

(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 560-61).
Nurses Funk and Vaughn testified that Karen Pool did
not follow Dr. Moench's order for a "stat" dose of Mellaril when
she administered the drug about two hours after it was ordered.
Although Sister M. Carolita Hart, this defendant's expert
witness, took exception to such an opinion, such an area of
concern would present a jury issue, but only if the plaintiff had
expert testimony as to the causal relationship between the
alleged delay in the administration of the drug and the
plaintiff's jump.

Because the plaintiff had no expert witness as

to causation, the plaintiff properly was not allowed to take the
Mellaril question to the jury.
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POINT V:

THE APPELLANT HAS NO EXPERT TESTIMONY TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE ALLEGED DELAY IN ADMINISTERING
THE MELLARIL OR THE ALLEGED ADMINISTRATION OF AN
INSUFFICIENT DOSE OF MELLARIL OR ANY OTHER ALLEGED
OMISSION WAS THE CAUSE OF THE APPELLANT'S JUMP ..__

The causal relationship in a medical malpractice case
must be established by expert testimony, except in those cases
where the causation is obvious.

A case in point is Huggins v.

Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957), which involved the
post-operative care of a gall bladder operation.

The trial court

set aside a verdict for the plaintiff and entered judgment n.o.v,
dismissing the action.

This Court held that the evidence was

insufficient to present a jury question as to whether the doctor
breached the standard of care of doctors in the community or as
to the proximate cause of the plaintiff's alleged injuries.

The

Court noted that the post-operative care of the gall bladder
operation depends upon complex scientific knowledge and cannot be
ascertained by common lay knowledge and that both the standard of
care and the proximate causation require expert testimony.
proximate causation, the Court stated:
As a general rule in a malpractice action,
expert testimony must be produced to show
that the injuries alleged were probably
caused by the lack of due care of defendant.
In the absence of such evidence, there is
nothing upon which a jury can base its
findings on the proximate cause of the
injury. The evidence must be substantial and
must, in cases of this complex type, have
foundation in expert medical testimony.
310 P.2d at 526.
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On

Without expert testimony as to causation, there is no
genuine issue of material fact, because without such testimony,
the action must fail and other fact issues can have no effect.

A

case in point is Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Gratton, 545 P.2d
670 (Mont. 1976), wherein the court held that even if all other
factual issues were determined in favor of the plaintiffs, there
would be no genuine issue of material fact without the requisite
expert testimony.
Another case in point is Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz.
542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975), where the court stated that expert
testimony is required to show whether the plaintiff's difficulty
from the first operation was more probably than not the result of
negligence.

This is a case where the court granted summary

judgment.
Similarly, in Graham v. St. Luke's Hospital, 46 Ill.
App. 2d 147, 196 N.E.2d 355 (1964), the court sustained a
directed verdict because no expert evidence was introduced to
show that causalgia was the result of the injection in that case.
And in DeFalco v. Long Island College Hospital, 393
N.Y. Supp. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1977), the court set aside a jury
verdict because expert testimony was lacking on the causation
between the alleged poor nursing practice and the loss of the
plaintiff's eye.

According to the court:

Nevertheless, such an obviously unsanitary
procedure lacked the requisite expert
testimony to prove that the presumably
unsterile eye patch carried enterobacter and
staph albus germs from the floo7 to t~e
plaintiff's eye and caused the infection.
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There was no evidence that the presumably
soiled bandage was the cause of the
infection. Causal connection between the
nurse's act and the plaintiff's injury was
not established by competent medical testimony
393 N.Y. Supp. 2d at 865.
Likewise, in the case at bar, the plaintiff needed to
produce expert testimony to the effect that the alleged lack of
due care by the hospital nurses was the cause of Mr. Farrow's
jump from his window.

This subject has to do with the inner

workings of the mind of the patient and how his thought processu
might have been altered by different conduct of the nurses.
Hence, a lay jury, untrained in a knowledge of psychiatry,
pharmacology and other related subjects, cannot fairly reach a
judgment on the causation issue without expert advice.
None of the plaintiff's expert witnesses can or did
state that any of the alleged omissions of the nurses was the
cause of Mr. Farrow's jump.

Specifically, Nurses Funk and Vaughn

were asked whether the alleged delay in the administration of
Mellaril caused the plaintiff to jump from his window.
answers were similar:

Q.

I am now asking about the effect. We
have gone through stat and I am talking about
the effect if it had been given earlier stat - as early as you said it should have
been, and if an orderly had run right down
and given it to him, you are not now saying
that the failure to give it to him at that
time was the cause for him to go out the
window, are you?
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Their

A. I am not saying because I am not a
pharmacist, because .I don't know that much
about drugs, but I don't think it would have
mattered.
(Deposition of Mary E. Vaughn, R. 672).
Q. But when you say if it would have been
given immediately, let's say that it was
given at 8:30, a:e you presuming that, say,
if it had been given to him at 8:30 that
would have made a difference in Mr. Farrow's
conduct that night?
A. Well, if it hadn't made a difference, I
don't see why he wrote "stat".
Q. The answer is you don't know what
difference it would have made; isn't that
true?

A.

I don't know.

(Deposition of Frances Funk, R. 594).
This respondent submitted the affidavits of three
medical expert witnesses under Rule 56, each of which states that
the delay, if any, in administering the Mellaril was not the
cause of the plaintiff's jump.

The affidavit of Bruce A. Walter,

Deputy Director of Health for the State of Utah is typical:
The drug "Mellaril" has its peak calming
effect within 1.25 to four hours after
administration. Therefore, if Karen Pool
administered the Mellaril to Mr. Farrow 10:00
p.m. on August 23, it would have reached its
peak effect before 2:40 a.m. on August 24, at
which time, I have been informed, Mr. Farrow
jumped. Hence, it is my opinion to a
reasonable medical certainty that any delay
in administering Mellaril was not a
contributing factor in Mr. Farrow's decision
to jump from his window, all other events or
conditions remaining the same.
(Affidavit of Bruce Alexander Walter, paragraph 9, R. 295).

To

the same effect are the affidavits of Sister M. Carolita Hart
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(paragraph Ge, R. 237) and Doctor Charles R. Smart (paragraph
R. 232).
Because the appellant failed to submit counter
affidavits pursuant to the Rule 56 procedure, he had no expert
testimony as to the cause of his injuries, and this respondent
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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10

I

CONCLUSION

In the area of medical malpractice this Court has held
in several cases, including Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40,
347, P.2d 1108 (1959), that the standard of care required by the
defendant must be established by expert testimony unless the
matter is one of common knowledge.

Because this case involves

complex knowledge in the fields of surgery, psychiatry and
pharmacology, expert testimony is a must.
In only one area, the administration of Mellaril, did
the plaintiff even arguably have such testimony.

However, in

that area, the plaintiff had no expert testimony that the alleged
delay in administering the Mellaril or the alleged improper dose
of Mellaril was the cause of the plaintiff's jump.

Without such

expert testimony on causation in a medical malpractice case, the
plaintiff has no case.

Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310

P.2d 523 (1957).
This respondent submitted the affidavits of three
medical expert witnesses stating that the alleged delay in
administering Mellaril to the plaintiff was not the cause of the
plaintiff's jump.

The plaintiff failed to respond with opposing

affidavits or other submissions under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and he was properly not allowed to proceed to
trial against this respondent.
Without the requisite expert testimony, the plaintiff
did not raise a genuine issue of material fact that would
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preclude summary judgment.

Shoberg v. Kelly, 1 Wash. App. 673,

466 P.2d 280 (1969).
It is submitted that the respondent, Health Services
Corporation, was properly relieved of the burden of a protracted
trial when it was clear that the plaintiff could not possibly
make a case against it.

We respectfully request the Court to

affirm the summary judgment below.
DATED this 29th day of November, 1978.
KIRTON, McCONKIE, BOYER & BOYLE
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APPENDIX
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING CHESTER E. FARROW
LDS Hospital, Aug. 23-24, 1974
4 p.m.

23-(Callahan takes vital signs
Callahan says Farrow receives drinking water

5 p.m.

6 p.m.

Gr~ff~ths talks to Farrow for hour on patio;
Griffiths notes Farrow more oriented than other
times; Callahan says meal taken in;
Later empty tray removed after Farrow eats
7 p.m. 151111-.~~-LCallahan says Farrow receives drinking water

Dr. Moench visits with Farrow in room
Callahan takes vital signs
Pool says Dr. Moench instructs on medications and
tells of hallucinations; Pool reads consult note
and discusses matter with shift personnel

8:30

General Observations of Afternoon Shift (4-11:30 p.m.) Aug. 23 :
Pool - "Several contacts" during shift; Farrow calm, quiet,
rational; No hallucinations noted
Callahan - Personally visited Farrow at least once an hour;
Conversations with Farrow about going home and his
little girl; Conversations made him feel better;
Had conversation about city lights; Farrow well
oriented, coherent, calm, relaxed; No mention of
voices
Peterson - Talked with Farrow on "numerous occasions" probably "4 or 5 times"; No voices mentioned

9 p.m.

Callahan gives "HS Care" - may have involved more
than one visit; Farrow quiet and well oriented;
Farrow accepts back rub and responds well to
conversation about going home and little girl;
Callahan cleans room and talks and prepares Farrow
for bed
Pool gives Farrow 100 mg. of mellaril
Callahan says Farrow has routine check before end
of shift
Pool reports to Karren and Hall about (1) Moench
request to observe Farrow; (2) Farrow allowed up
11: 45
and around; (3) New medications; (4) Farrow had been
quiet, calm, and resting - no probl7ms
12 a.m.~Aug 24 Hall visits Farrow, in bed and resting; Farrow.says
nothing needed; H~ll inst:ucts on using call light
and says to call if anything nee~ed; Farrow.
rational and coherent; No complaints; No voices
1 a.m.}-[
Karren checks Farrow; Room dark and Farrow still and
l: 30
quiet; Karren believes Farrow asleep and leavese

l

-
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